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The testator by his will devised a portion of his real estate to his son,
and other portions to his daughter. After the execution of his will he
-conveyed to his daughter part of the real estate he had devised to his
-son. On bill filed by the son to compel the daughter to elect whether
-she would take under the deed or under the will; Held (I), That the
,couveyance by the testator, after the execution of his will, of the lands
devised to the son, operated as a revocation of the devise to the son.
(2) That the daughter was not under an obligation to make an election
,between the conveyance to her by deed, and the benefits to be derived
under the will.
:SUBSEQUENT DEALINGS, BY THE TESTATOR, WITH 'DEVISED,
PROPERTY.'
While this case presents no very difficilt or novel question,
it contrasts clearly the two doctrines, of equitable election and
what is known as the "revocation" of a devise, by the subse-
.quent alienation of the property devised; and illustrates
happily the nature of each of these doctrines.
The object of this annotation will be to examin6 into the
present state of the law in America, as regards the effect pro-
duced upon devises by subsequent dealings, on the part of the
.testator, with the devised property.
Reported in 29 AtL. Rep. 187.
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The precise point of the principal case was decided, in.
South Carolina, as long ago as 1847, in the case of Thompson-
v. Thompson, 2 Strob. 48. There, the testator, long after the-
date of his will, conveyed land therein devised to A, to B, who
was also a devisee under the will; and it was held that the
testator thereby gave to B the land in addition to that given
by the will, and that the doctrine of election did not apply.
As quoted in the principal case (p. 19o) the court there said,
"When the testator gives his own estate to one person, and
the estate of that person to another, the intention is manifest
that the second devisee shall have the estate of the first, and
that intention creates a condition that the first devisee shall
not take the estate given to him unless he relinquish his own
estate to tfie person to whom the testator has devised it. If,
in this case, the testator had first conveyed the plantation to.
the defendant, and afterwards devised it to the plaintiff, the
defendant could not take by the conveyance without defeating
the devise to the plaintiff. To take his own estate by the
deed, and, in addition, claim what was given by the will,
would be against the intention of the testator; and the
defendant would be put to an election, either to take.under
the deed, and relinquish his claim under the will, or to take
under the will, and relinquish to the devisee the plantation
claimed by the deed. But the conveyance to the defendant
was made after the date of the will. By it the devise to the-
plaintiff was revoked, with the same effect as if the plantation
had been devised to the defendant by a codicil. It was the,
intention of the testator that the defendant should take both
under the deed and under the will, and there is no subject
for election."
At the outset it seems imperative, in the cause of clearness
and consistency, to quarrel with the common nomenclature
of the doftrine which is to be considered.
The error, if error it be, dates far back; for, in the earliest
reported decisions, there are numerous loose expressions to
the effect that alienation or other dealing with the property
devised effected a revocation of the will: Powell, 377; Dister
v. Dister, 3 Lev. lO8; Cotter v. Layer, 2 P. Wms. 623;.
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Sparrow v. lardcastle, 3 Atk. 798; Marwood v. Turner,
3 P. Wms. 163; Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 258.
When this rule came, to be practically applied, it was soon
-made obvious that a literal interpretation would lead to
undesirable results; and the phrase was modified by saying
-that the revocation would be pro tanto only; that, so far as
,other property was concerned, the will would continue to
.operate. And a still nearer approach to accuracy was made,
when the revocation was said to be, not of the will, but of the
.devise. Yet, the courts have adhered to the -traditional term
'"revocation," and this in spite of frequent animadversions
-from judges and text writers to the effect that the word should
never have been dragged into this connection at all. Even,
with its later qualifications, although it may lead to no sei-ious
mistakes, it offends against that accuracy and nicety of expres-
:sion which ought ever to characterize legal language.
One does not find decisions to the effect that when a testator
-parts with the subject-matter of a specific legacy, the will, or
the legacy either, is "revoked." The phrase used is "ademp-
.tion." The will remains as valid as ever; it is not revoked in
whole or in part; but a portion of it is deprived of effect,
merely because there is nothing for it to operate upon. How
is the case altered by the substitution of real property for 'per-
.sonal?
The technical limitation of the word "ademption," to per-
.sonal property, might be an objection to its use here; but
surely it would be better to stretch that meaning, or to employ
.a circumlocution, than to use a word, which, though sanctioned
,by tradition, is worse than meaningless.
The whole matter was very well stated by Weston, J., in
Carter v. Thomas (4 Greenl. 341), decided in 1826. He says:
"By the revocation of a will we generally understand an act
.by which the will ceases to have any effect. And" this may
"be considered the meaning of the term, strictly and accuratily
speaking. It is not, however, uniformly used in this sense by
legal writers, or in English judicial opinions.; but it is frequently
applied to cases where the will operates upon some estate,
ibut not upon others, by reason of some conveyance or modi-
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fication, made therein by the testator in his lifetime. When.
therefore, this position is laid down generally, that an altera-
tion made in the estate devised, amounts to a revocation of the.
will, we must understand the meaning to be, so far as such
alteration is inconsistent therewith. When a portion only of.
that which is the subject-matter of the will is parted with by the
testator in his lifetime, the will cannot have the effect originally
intended; and whether the whole will* remains, but partially
defeated in its operation, or such alteration is regarded as a.
revocation Pro tanto, the will has its effect upon the estate-
which is left unaltered."
While the courts have clung to the traditional expression,
they have not allowed it to lead them astray.
No reported case actually holds that any dealing with part
of the devised property works a revocation of the entire will.
The revocation is only pro tanto, and the remainder of the
instrument stands unaffected: Hirkness v. Bayley, Prec. Ch.
575; Tucker v. .Thurston, 17 Ves. 134; Clark v. Bukeley, 2
Vern. 720; Coke v. Bullock, Cro. Jac. 49; Livingston v. Living-
ston, 3 Johns. Ch. 155 ; Adams v.. Winne, 7 Paige, 97 ; Vande-
mark v. Vandemark, 26 Barb. 416; Coulson v. Zlohnes, 5
Sawy. C. C. 279; Hawes v. Humphrey, 9 Pick. 350; Floyd v.
Floyd, 7 B. Mon. 290; Clingan v. lYitchtree, 31 Pa. 25 ; In re
Tillman's Estate, 31 Pac. 563 (Cal.).
In Massachusetts it has been held that where a testator
disposed by will of his entire estate, and subsequently sold all
of his real estate, and died possessed of personalty alone,
the will stood as a will of personalty, and was, accordingly,
revocable by any writing sufficient to revoke a will of personal
estate: Brown v. Thorndike, 15 Pick. 388.
Although the point has often been made in argument, that,
if the alienation or alteration of part of the property devised,.
operates a revocation of the will, then such revocation ought
to be a bar to the probate of the will, the courts have always
steered clear of this dangerous doctrine.
So, im South Carolina, where a testator sold all his lands.
and part of his personalty after the date of his will, this was
'held no obstacle to the probate: Prater v. Whittle, I6 S..
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Car. 4o (1881); also, Balliet's Appeal, 14 Pa. 451 (1850);:
Harris v. Humphrey, 9 Pick. 350 (1830); Coulson v. Holmes,.
5 Sawy C. C. 279 (1878). In .fecRainy v. Clarke, 2 Taylor,
278 (N. C. 1816), it was said that by the sale of certain lands,
subsequent to the making of a will devising them, "the will
would not have been revoked, properly speaking, so as to pre-
vent its probate; but the only effect would be an ademption
of the* devise of the pirticular lands conveyed." See also.
Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. 475 (1884).
Cases where the testator had parted with his whole estate,
so, that he died possessed of nothing upon which the will
could operate, seem to have presented somewhat more diffi-
culty, though it is obvious that they differ from the former
class only in degree. But, although these are loose expres-
sions here and there, the actual decisions are consistent and
reasonable.
In a recent New Hampshire case, the court came to the
conclusion that, in that State, at least, the common law has
been so modified "as to raise the question whether a case can
now arise of a total revocation by implication of law, when
there is any estate upon which the will can operate." "And
a case is possible," said they, "where a will may operate to
control the appointment of an administrator or guardian, even
if there is no estate to be transmitted by it. . . . A will may
be a mere appointment under a power. The question whether
a will is' entitled to probate does not depend upon the ques-.
tion whether, at the time of the testator's death, or at any
previous or subsequent time, there was any. property which it
could dispose of:" Morey v. So/ter, 2 N. Erig. 269 (N. H.
1886). See also, In re Tillman's Estate, 31 Pac. 563 (Cal. 1892).
So far as appears, in only one reported case in America, has
the court, through too close a dependence upon the letter of
authority, riade the error,-which might be a serious one,-
of holding, that where a testator makes a deed to all the
property which he has devised by his will, the act amounts to
a revocation of the will, and may be pleaded in bar to its pro-
bate: Epps v. Dean, 26 Ga. 533 (1859). See Graves v.
Sheldon, 2 D. Chip. 71 (Vt. 1824).
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has trenched upon some-
what doubtful ground, having enunciated the doctrine that
if a testator, after making his will, sell so great a part of
the real estate devised as to render it impossible to give
effect to the dispositions of his will, it amounts to a fevo-
cation of the will. The- testator, seized of Whiteacre and
Blackacre, directed his executors to sell the former for the
payment of his debts; and certain legacies, and gave the resi-
due of his property of all kinds, after the payment of said
legacies, to certain other legatees. Afterwards he sold White-
acre, and received the purchase money, and, dying, his per-
sonal property barely sufficed to pay his debts, leaving noth-
ing for the legacies first named. Held, under the circum-
stances, the testator intended by the. sale of Whiteacre to
revoke his will as to everything but the appointrhent of execu-
tors. In re Cooper's Estate, 4 Barr. 88 (1846).
In a later case the court said, "There seems to be no rea-
sonable doubt that in this State, under the Act of 1833, im-
plied revocations by operation of law, in cases of alienation by
deed, still exist. The rule is, that the revocation is, accord-,
ing to the common phrase, pro tanto. The question is to
what extent these words are to be carried. The spirit and
reason of the rule seems to embrace all that part of the will,
the execution of which is either totally destroyed and pre-
vented by the alienation, or is so far mutilated and impaired as
to remove from the remnant the trace or impress of the testator's
intent. It is revoked because it no longer is the will or intent
of the testator. There have been cases, and will be again,
where it is impossible to define with mathematical precision
the exact line where the intention to revoke ceases. These
must be left to the judgment of the courts." The princi-
ple of In re Cooper was affirmed, but held not to apply in
this case: COULTER, J., in Marshall v. Marshall, i I Pa. 430
(1849).
These cases virtually add to the statutory modes of revoca-
tion; another, i. e., by so large an ademption as to indicate
a change of the testator's intention.
The body of the modern English law on the subject under
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consideration dates back no further than 1838, and may,
therefore, be regarded as beyond the present purpose; while,
in America, the matter is so largely regulated by enactment
in the various States as to render the older English cases of
relatively small importance in a general discussion.
Yet, there are some States in which no statutory regula-
tions have been made; the acts in existence are not always
all-comprehensive, and in many instances a knowledge of the
common law doctrines is essential to an understanding of the
very statutes themselves. Therefore, a brief review of the
English law, prior to the statute of I Victoria, seems to be
necessary.
At the basis of all the decisions lies the fundamental doctrine
of the common law that a will was an appointment of 'real
estate, and operated only upon such real estate as the testator
had at the time of making it. (See Spong v. Spong, I Y. and J.
300; How- v., Dartinout&, 7 Ves. 147; Arthur v. Ardiur,
IO Barb. 9). Accompanying these rules were the corollaries:
first, that any real estate acquired subsequently to the date of
the will could not pass thereunder without a republication;
and, second, that if, subsequently to the date of the will, the
testator aliened real estate devised therein, or the f6rm of his
interest in such real estate became materially altered, this
would be construed as a revocation of the devise.
Thus far, although there is roo-n for difference of opinion
as to the wisdom of the theory, there is nothing in it which
is obviously unjust or repugnant to common sense. Yet,
from this apparently innocent starting-point, the courts pro-
ceeded, by gradual stages, each step seeminj the inevitable
consequence of its predecessor, until a position of injustice,
and even of absurdity, was reached, from which there was no
rescue but by the intervention of the Legislature.
Losing sight of the original rule that, in order for an iliera-
tion in the estate to effect a revocation of the devise, it must be
a material alteration, it was held that, a devise could not take
effect unless the interest of the testator as, devised remained
identically the same from the date of the will down to the
testator's death: See Lord Hardwicke in Sparrow v. Hardastle,
SUBSEQUENT DEALINGS, BY THE TESTATOR,
3 Atk. 798. From this rule the conclusion seemed irresistible
that if a testator aliened real estate previously devised in his
will, the devise was thereby revoked, and that, even though he
subsequently had the land reconveyed to him, for, looking at
it technically, there was an "alteration " or "new modelling"
of the estate.
And it was even more evident that this land reconveyed to
the testator was, legally speaking, an estate newly acquired
subsequent to the making of the will, and could not pass
under it.
So far, the only obvious falsity was the conftsion between
material and immaterial alterations in the estate; but that was
enough. For when the doctrine was pushed to its limits, the
result was a high degree of artificiality, and, in many instances,
the defeat of the testator's intention.
In the great case of Cave v. Ho/ford (3 Ves. 65o), in 1798,
-where the matter was thoroughly investigated and the rule
declared to be firmly established, Mr. Justice Rooke, in
delivering the opinion of the majority, remarked: "It is often
contrary to the intention of the testator that the will should be
annulled; it often bears hard upon individuals to enforce the
rule strictly; but the rule is so; and if it produces more mis-
chief than good, the Legislature in its wisdom may alter it;
but we are bound as judges to declare and abide by it." And
Chief Justice Eyfe, though he considered himself bound to
recognize the authorities, dissented vigorously from the exten-
sion of the rule to any new set of facts, saying that "the
doctrine of revocation has been carried to a very inconvenient
extent, in consequence of which many wills have been cruelly
disappointed, and many families greatly distressed."
And, in a later case, Vice-Chancellor Wood characterized
the former state of the law as "that law by which, with a
species of remorseless logic, any person who had once made
a will, and afterwards disposed of his interest for any purposes
whatever, even although he might get back the identical
estate which he parted with, was held to hive revoked his
will. This mode of entirely defeating a testator's intention by
the magic of a conveyance is a logical application of the doc-
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trine that a will is an appointment of real estate. Being an
actual appointment of a specific thing, and that specific thing
being otherwise dealt with, although immediately taken back
again into the same hand which dealt it out, it was considered
to have been destroyed and gone:" Grant v. Bridges, L. R.
3 Eq. 347 (1866).
Bad, indeed, must have been the state of the law to have
elicied such censure; and bad, indeed, it was. Onone side,
the doctrine of effectuating the testator's intention.was pushed
so far that an instrument incapable of taking effect as a con-
veyance of real estate was, nevertheless, construed to be a
revocation of the will, in spite of the Statute of Frauds:
Montague v. Jefferies, 7 Ves. 370; Doe v. Liandaff, 2 Bos.
and P. N. R. 491 ; Ex parte Earl of Ilchester, 7 Ves. 348;
Shrove v. Pinke, 5 T. R. 124, 310; Simpson v. Walker,
5 Sim. I.
That such cases as these should have been linked with
cases of ademption, as by ROOKE, J., in Cave v. Ho/ford, 7 T.
R. 399 (et infra), and by Lord Hardwicke in Sparrow v. -ard-
castle, 3 Atk. 798 (et infra), marks the confusion which had
crept into the law. In reality, revocation is always dependent
upon the testator's intention, either expressed, or necessarily
inferred from his actions, as in the case of a subsequent mar-
riage and the birth of issue. Ademption, on the other hand,
is entirely independent of intention, and amounts simply to
this, that a man's will cannot pass what he no longer has, or,
under the artificial rulings, what he no longer has in precisely
the same form in which he. devised it.. The two doctrines
have nothing in common. Suppose a man devised, aliened,
and took back the same estate; he might intend thiat the de-
vise should stand unrevoked, but under the old law it was
void because a will could not pass subsequently, acquired
property. And the injustice of this conclusion arose from the
artificiality of this rule of law, and not from the fact that the
court disregarded the desires of the testator.
The devise was void because the property had been alien-
ated, no matter what was the purpose of the testator in so
alienating.
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Any, the slightest, alteration in the form of the testator's
interest in the devised property, was held to work, what was
inaccurately called a revocation of the devise, or what was
really an ademption. The estate was, legally speaking,
altered, or had lost its identity. Therefore, it could not pass
by the devise.
Thus, a devise was held revoked by a recovery to the uses
of the devisor, because the estate was altered, though the
devisor took back the old use: Dister v. Dister, 3 Lev. Io8;
Dailey v. Dailey, 3 Wils. 6; Arthur v. Bockenham, Fitz. 240;
Marwood v. Turner, 3 P. Wms. 163.
Where a man made a marriage settlement on a person
whom he never married or asked to marry him, this was de-
termined to be a revocation of a prior will, although the con-
veyance was for a special purpose, which failed, and he was in
of the old use: Lord Lincoln v. Rolls, Eq. Cas. Abr. 409.
Lord Mansfield, in Doe v. Pot&, I Doug. 709, observed:
"All revocations which are not agreeable to the intention of
the testator are founded upon artificial and absurd reasoning.
The absurdity of Lord Lincoln's case is shocking. However,
it is now law." This remark, though deserved, wilr be seen
to be directed. rather at the effect than at the cause. The root
of the evil was not the- disregard of the testator's intention,
but the carrying to the point of %bsurdity, the rule that an
alteration in- devised property ,".uld render the devise void.
And the result of this artificial' y was to defeat intentions.
In Sparrow v. Hardcasth, 3 Atk. 798, Lord Hardwicke
said: " If-a man make a w'11 devising land, and after execute
a feoffment to his own use, it is a revocation of the will, notwith-
standing it is in point of law the old use. So, likewise, a feoff-
ment without livery, a bargain and sale not enrolled, or any
other imperfect conveyance will be a revocation, because the
estate is gone, and the will his lost the subject of its operation."
In the leading case of Cave v. Hoford (7 T. R. 399; 3 Ves.
65o), it was settled that where a testator, after the will, con-
veyed the estate to trustees, in trust for himself in fee till
marriage, and for default of issue, to the use of himself in fee,
and then married and died without issue, the conveyance was
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held a revocation of a devise in fee to take effect only in case
he had no issue. The conveyance, in this case, it will be
observed, "so far from being inconsistent with the will,
respects nothing but what is expressly reserved out of the
will." Rooke, J., said: "There is a revocation which does
not depend upon the intention of the testator; as where he
takes back the very same estate. The consequence of law is,
that the will is revoked, whether he intended to revoke it or
not. There are other cases where, intending- to revoke, a
man has made use of a mode of conveyance, which is never
completed. As where a man grants a reversion upon an estate
for life which he has devised, and the tenant never attorns.
So in the case of a bargain and sale without enrollment. But
the revocation applicable to this case is, where the testator
alters his legal interest without any intention to revoke the
will. As to that, if the whole fee is conveyed, it annuls
entirely the effect of the vill, unless the testator republishes
it:" See also Gosdtitle v. Otway, 7 T. R. 399 (1797). "
In short the doctrine of these cases was "that by a convey-
.ance of the estate devised the 3vill was revoked, because the
estate was altered, though the testator took back the same
estate, and by the same instrument or by a declaration of
uses, and though. he did not intend to revoke. It was revoked
upon technical grounds, because the estate had been altered:"
Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 273.
A parting with anything less than the testator's' entire
interest would work a revocation of the devise pro tanto only.
Thus, if a devise was made, and subsetquently the testator
leased -the land for any term less than the whole estate
devised, there was a revocation only pro tanto; the land
passed to the devisee, subject to the term, and to the devisee
the rent would be paid: Gardner v. Sheldon, Vaughan, 259;
Lamb v. Parker, 2 Vern. 495 ; Coke v. Bullock, Cro. Jac. 49.
A devise was held revoked by an exchange of the land,
although after the testator's death it was discovered that title
had never been perfected in the other party to .the exchange,
and the land was, in consequence, restored to the heir
Attorney-General v. Vigors, 8 Ves. 256.
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It was uniformly held that a valid agreement to sell and
convey lands revoked a previous devise as well as an actual
conveyance: Cotter v. Layer, 2 P. Wins. 623 ; Rider v. Wager,
Ibid. 332; Mayer v. Go-w/and, Dick. 563; Knollys v. Alcock,
5 Ves. 648; Vawser v.Jeffrey, 16 Ves. 519.
There were certain exceptions to the rigor of the common
law rule. In Cave v. Ho/ford, Rooke, J., said: "Parceners
and tenants in common, being seized only of an undivided
portion in the whole, would retain the same estate and interest
after partition; and if it is done by deed and fine, instead of
by writ, the court has so far indulged them as to say the prior
devise is not revoked:" Risley v. Raltinglass, Sir T. Raym. 240;
Knollys v. Alcock, 5 Ves. 648, 655.
In certain instances equity intervened, as where, having' the
complete legal and beneficial estate at the date of the will, the
testator divested himself of the legal estate, but remained
owner of the equitable interest, as in the case of a mortgage
or a conveyance.for payment of debts, by which a devise was
not revoked in equity, though after the debts were paid the
devisor took a conveyance to him and his heirs: Harmood v.
Oglander, 6 Ves. 199 (18oI).
A mortgage in fee after a devise was held a revocation pro
tanta only, 9r quo ad the special purpose: Tucker v. Thurstan,
17 Ves. I6i (18io); Biydges v. Duchess of Chandos, 2 Ves.
Jr. 417; Perkins v. Walker, I Vern. 97; Hall v. Dench,
I Vern. 329; Temple v. Chandos, 3 Ves. 685 ;. Cave v. Hoi-
ford, 3 Ves. 65o. It was held that the devisee should be
admitted to the redemption, "for the intent of the mortgagor,
making the mortgage, could be no other than only to serve
his special purpose of borrowing money to supply his present
occasions:" Hall v. Denc (supra).
The statute of I Vict. Cap. 26, § 19, et seq., enacts that no
wills made on or after January i, 1838, "1shall be revoked by
any presumption of an intention on the ground of an altera-
tion in circumstances;" and that no conveyance of real estate
made after the execution of a will, or other act in relation to
such estate, shall prevent the operation of the will upon such
portion of the estate as the testator may have power to dis-
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pose of at his death. Thus, after two and a half centuries,
the qucre of Brooke, in his Abridgnent (tit. Devise, pl. 8),
where he suggests that "an alienation and taking back ought
not to defeat a will made before, because it is no will till
death," became the established law of England. (See opinion
of Rooke, J., in Cave v. Holford.)
Turning to the American cases, we find that they may be
divided into two general classes: (I) Decisions based upon
State statutes, and (2) Decisions made in States prior to the
passage of any statutes, or in States where, down to the
present time, no statute has been. enacted.
This second class, is based, in the main, directly upon the
English common law doctrines, and presents some interesting
developments and deductions therefrom.
Any detailed catalogue of the various State enactments.
would be misplaced here.
It is sufficient to say that, in the main, where such statutes.
exist they are substantially similar to the English statute, and,
provide that " no conveyance or alteration of estate which
does not wholly divest the testator of all interest'in the prop'-"
erty mentioned in the will, shall prevent the operatibn of the'
instrument with respect to that which the testator may have
power to dispose of at the time of his death:" Bech on
Wills, § 67.
Such statutes are in force in California, Dakota, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, New York, North Carolina,.
Ohio, Virginia, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and some other
States: Stinson's Amer. St. Law (Jan.. I, 1886)! g 28Io;
Code Maryland, Art. 93, § 309; Penna., Act Apr. 8, 1833,
§ io; South Carolina, Act 1858, 12 Stat. 700; New York,
2 R. S. 57, § 5-64, § 42-48.
In Alabama and Indiana the statutes provide expressly that.
the conveyance of previously devised property and taking back
a new estate therein, will not effect a revocation unless the will.
or conveyance show an intention on the testator's part so to,
do: Ala. Code, § 2289; Ind. Rev. Stat., § 2565. So, in
Louisiana, where it is clearly proved that the testator did not
intend to revoke : Blakemore's Succession, 9 So. 496.
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But, under the statutes of most of the above mentioned
States, where, in such a conveyance, the intention to revoke is
expressed, or where the provisions of the conveyance are
totally inconsistent with the devise, a revocation will be
implied: Beach on Wills, § 67 ; Stinson's Amer. Stat. L.,
§ 281 o-A.
Such statutes as these, introducing the element of intention,
really do nothing more or less than constitute a new method
of revoking a will, or part thereof.
In Kentucky, by statute, where the devisee is also the heir of
the testator, the mere sale of land devised will not raise a pre-
sumption of revocation. It must be shown that the testator
so intended: Gen. Stat. Ky., Art. 3, § I ; Hazelwood v. Webster,
82 Ky. 409 (1884).
In Alabama, it is provided by statute, that a subsequent sale
and conveyance of the lands devised does not operate a revo-
cation of the devise when any part of the purchase money
remains unpaid at the death of the testator, unless the inten-
tion that it shall so operate clearly appears by some instrument
in writing : Code, § 2287 ; Slaughter v. Stevens, 81 Ala. 418
(i886).
The question is also affected by another set of statutory con-
siderations.
In all the States "Wills Acts" are in force, in which are
enumerated the various legal methods by which the will may
be revoked. In some instances, revocations by implication
are saved by express provision (e.g., Mass. Stats. I 88z, p. 748,
§ 8; N. Hamp. Gen. Laws, Cap. 193, § 14); in others, no
reference is made to such cases, and the statutes declare that
no will or part thereof can be revoked save in some one of
the ways named in an almost literal transcript of the statute
of 29 Car. IL
Consequently, we find ntimerous decisions, where certain
dealings with previousjly devised property, by the testator, are
held not to constitute revocations of the devise, because no
such method of revocation is contemplated by the local stat-
ute: Wooler' v. WVoolery, 48 Md. 523 ; Praterv. Whittle, I6 S.
Car. 40; Spoonemore v. Cables, 66 Mo. 579. When we reflect
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that the term revocation is a misnomer in such cases, these de-
cisions, though correct in their conclusions, seem a trifle
flimsy in their reasoning.
Of course, no court has gone to the length of holding that
when a testator has sold and conveyed property, and has no
-interest in it at his death, the will is not thereby "revoked"
.so far as that property is concerned, even though no such
method of "revocation" be contemplated by the statute. But
the 'courts. have been driven to far-fetched reasoning in their
desire to render common-sense decisions, and'not a little con-
fusion has arisen, through the persistent and unreflecting em-
ployment of the term revocation. See Adams v. Winne, 7
Taige, 97 (N. Y.); In re Dowd's Estate, 58 How. Pr. 107
,(N. Y.). In Cozzens v.Jamison, 12 Mo. Ap. 452-the court,
referring to the local statute, said: "The Legislature, in
.speaking of a revocation, mu*st have intended to use the word
in the sense in -which it wds used in the- English statute, and-
did not mean to include the case of ademption, by parting
during the lifetime of the testator, with the land devised, nor
to change the rule applicable to a devise of lands, that, where
the testator sells the land devised, that provision of his will
;becomes at once inoperative."
Aside from statute, the English common law rules have
,generally been adopted in America. The leading case is
Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 258 (I823),'where it was
held that a devise of land, once revoked, expressly or by
-implication, cannot be restored without a republication of the
will. If a testator conveys the estate devised, though he
takes it back again by the same instrument, or otherwise, it is
.a revocation at law and in equity, even though he did not
intend to revoke his will.
This may, perhaps, be -regarded as authoritative in such
States as have not statutory provisions regulating the matter.
:See Brown v. Brown, 16 Barb. 569 (1852). 1 .
Where a testator sells devised property, and then makes a
contract with the purchaser for the reconveyance of the prop-
•erty, and dies before this contract is performed, he dies pos-
.sessed of no interest which can pass by his will, unless it is
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capable of operating upon subsequently acquired property:
Lanning v. Cole, 2 Halst. Ch. 1o2 (1847).
Contracts to Sell and Convey.
At a very early date it wAs decided, in New Jersey, that
whatever might be the rule in equity, an agreement by a.
testator, after the execution of his will, to sell lands therein
devised, was not a revocation at law, the court saying: "An
intention to sell does not revoke a will by which the property
is devised." Hall v. Bray, Coxe, 212 (1794).
But, in New York, in the leading case of Walton v. Walton,
7 Johns. Ch. 258, it was held that, in equity, such a contract
was a revocation of the devise; and .this even though the
contract had been rescinded by the mutual consent of the
parties, so that the testator was restored to his former estate
and died seised thereof. In a later case it was said, m6re
accurately, that the will remained in force as to the legar
estate, which passed *to the devisee, who became a trustee for
the purchaser and would be compelled to convey: Gaines v-
Winthrop, 2 Edw. Ch. 571 (1835).
These principles are reaffirmed in the case of Donohoo v.
Lea, I Swan- 119 (Tenn. 1851), which may be taken as.
expressing the American law in all States where the matter is
not regulated by statute.
And in many of the States, including Arkansas, California,.
Kansas, Missouri, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Wash-
ington, and some others, the statutes expressly provide that
"an agreement to convey property previously devised does
not revoke the gift, but that the property shall pass to the
devisees, subject to such remedies for enforcement of specific
performance as might have been law against the heirs or next
of kin:" Beach on Wills, § 57 ; Stinson's Am. Stat. L., § 281 o.
Partition.
The English doctrine as to partitions has been followed in
America. In Duffel's Lessee v. Burton, 4 Harr. 290 (Del..
1843), it was held that a will of lands held in common, is not
revoked by proceedings for partition under which the testator
accepts and becomes seized of the whole in severalty. But.
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such devise does not pass the after-acquired portion of the
lands, even though it be expressed to be of "my part" of
the lands : Scafe v. Thompson, 15 S. Car. 337 (188o).
In Duffel v. Burton, the court examined into the subject,
saying: "The case of partition seems to be an excepted case,
even where, to effect the partition a conveyance is necessary.
. . . The reason of this seems to be that the object of the
convey;ance is really not to pass title, but to effect a severance
of the manner of holding, and the estate towhich the will
applies being liable to this change without enlargement or re-
striction, the will is reasonably to be regarded as applying to it
in its severed form of holding as well as when- it was held in
common."
Mortgage of Devised Land.
In McTaggart v. Thompson, 14 Pa. 149, it was held that
mortgages are only a revocation in equity, pro tanto or quo ad
their special purpose. Though in form purporting to be con-
veyances of the .estate, yet in equity always, and now at law,
they are regarded but as securities for debts. They are not
to be viewed as alterations or changes of the estate, but are
"merely revocations pro tanto, or ademptions, rather than revo-
cations of the will.
Any interest or right of redemption, or other right remain-
ing in the testator at his death would fall within the operation
of the devise: Stubbs v. Houston, 33 Ala. 555. The fact that
the mortgage was made to the devisor, even under the belief
that the will was invalid, and with the intention that it should
be substituted-for the will, would make no difference: M cTag-
gart v. Thomp.son ; Stubbs v. Houston.
Sale of Devised Land with Purchase Money-Mortgage.
If a testator sells land previously devised, and takes back a
mortgage for all or part of the purchase money, the devise is
nevertheless adeemed. The mortgage will pass under the
residuary clause. The mortgage passes no title, but simply
creates a lien upon the property for security, of a part of the
purchase money: Adams v. Winne, 7 Paige, 97; Beck v.
McGiis, 9 Barb. 35; Brown v. Brown, 16 Barb. 569 ;
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McNaughton v. McAraughton, 34 N. Y. 20 1; Emery v. Unim
Society, 79 Me. 334 (1887).
Conversion of Real Estate into Personalty.
Of course, whenever real estate devised, is sold, this amounts
to an ademption; the devisee has no claim to the proceeds:
Beck v. McGillis, 9 Barb. 35 ; Vandemark v. Vandemark, 26
Barb. 416.
A change from personalty into real estate will revoke a
bequest, as where a testator forecloses a mortgage disposed of
by his will, and buys in the land: Ballard v. Carter, 5 Pick.
112 (1827.); Bingham v. Winchester, I Metc. 390 (1840).
Sale in Fee Reserting Rent.
A grant in fee of previously devised property, renders the
devise inoperative, although a rent be reserved, with a clause
of re-entry: Herrington v. Budd, 5 Denio, 321.
So, in Pennsylvania, where, upon such a grant, a ground
rent in fee wa reserved, it was held that the conveyance was
.an entire transfer and disposal of the estate, and a substitution
of an incorporeal hereditament issuing out of the ground, which
preserved to the grantor no residuary estate in the land, so
that there was nothing left for the devise to operate upon:
Skerrett v. Burd, I Whart. 246.
Conveyances in Trust for Special Purposes.
In general, a conveyance to trustees for some particular pur-
pose, such as the payment of debts, and then to reconvey to
the grantor, or his heirs, resembles a mortgage, in that it is
held to render void a previous devise of the lands, only quo ad
the -special purpose: Tivingston v. Lizngston, 3 Johns. Ch. 148;
Jones v. Hartley, 2 Whart. 103; Hughes v. Hughes, 2 Munf.
2o9 . So, where the deed of trust was to the executors, the
residue to go to the devisee, it was held to be onl~r an ademp-
tion pro tanto: Minuse v. Coxr, 5 Johns. Ch. 441.
Of course, if the purpose of the trust exhausts the entire
estate, the devise is deprived of all effect, just as by an abso-
lute conveyance: Clingan v, Mitchtree, 31 Pa. 25 ; Coilq5 v.
Smith, 15 S. E. 584 (Va.).
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Inoperative Conveyances.
In the old case of Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 269, it
was held that a conveyance totally inoperative for want of
completion or incapacity of the grantee, may amount to a revo-
cation if it shows the intention of the testator to revoke his will.
As remarked above, this theory has no connection with the
doctrine of ademption. There is not a defeat of the devise be-
cause of subsequent dealing with the devised property. There
is simply an additional method'of revoking.a will besides those
specified in the statute.
And this appears clearly in a recent case, where it is held
that a conveyance executed by one who is mentally incapaci-.
tated, or unduly influenced, is ineffectual as a revocation, since
there must be animus revocandi: Graham v. Burch, 47 Minn.
171 (1891).
In Louisiana there is an express statutory provision that a
subsequent conveyance will'operate a revocation, although the-
sale or donation be null and void, and the thing has returned
to the possession of the testator: IA. Civ. Code, § 1696.
Conveyance to the Devisee.
A conveyance of land is a revocation of the devise, even
though the devisee and grantee are the same* person, for he
will take by the deed and not by the will: Arthur v. Arthur,
io Barb..9; Rose v. Rose, 7 Barb. 174; Marshall v. Rench,, 3
Del. Ch. 239. This has been held to be so, even though the
deed was cancelled in the lifetime of the testator: Kean's
Will, 9 Dana, 25 (Ky.). See contra, Woolery v. Woolery, 48
Ind. 523.
But conveyance to a devisee, of other lands than those de-.
vised has never been held to be an implied 'revocation of the-
devise: Marshall v. Rench (supra) ; Arthur v. Arthur (supra).
Increase in Value of Property.
The great increase in the value of devised property by the-
erection of buildings thereon, is not a revocation of the de-
vise, although the devise was made in satisfaction of a debt:
Havens v. Havens, I Sand. Ch. 324 (N. Y.). See also Wogan-
v. Small, I1 S. & R. 141. SAMUEL DREHER MATLACK.
